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ON COMMUNICATION
John Greenman*

Everybody knows that communication is important, but nobody knows how
to define it. The best scholars refer to it. Free-speech law protects it. But no
one-no scholar or judge-has successfully captured it. Few have even
tried.
This is the first article to define communication under the law. In it, I explain why some activities-music, abstract painting, and parading-are
considered communicative under the First Amendment, while others-sex,
drugs, and subliminal advertising-arenot. I argue that the existing theories of communication, which hold that communicative behaviors are
expressive or convey ideas, fail to explain what is going on in free-speech
cases. Instead, communication hinges on the free will of the recipient. By
this I mean that communication occurs when Person A conveys a thought
to Person B, and Person B freely chooses whether to accept that thought.
An act is communicative, in other words, if the important change that A
wants to make in B's mind occurs only if B wills it to, as happens during
an argument.
Reconceptualizing communication in this way-as behaviors meant to
change minds through the free will of the listener-would solve deep and
persistent First Amendment problems. It would explain which behaviors
are communicative and therefore potentially covered by the First Amendment. Adopting the free-will theory would clarify the analysis in
historically muddled areas such as the First Amendment treatment of nude
dancing. But it would also shed light on the law governing new forms of
behavior such as publication of computer-programmingcode.
More broadly, the free-will theory of communication can point us in new
directions. We are used to thinking of communication in ways that don't
describe it, and these errors may keep us from recognizing new forms of
communication as they develop. Applying the free-will theory of communication, I argue, will prepare us for technological changes that will make
our old metaphorsfor communication obsolete.

*
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INTRODUCTION

Everybody knows that communication is important, but nobody knows2
how to define it. The best scholars refer to it.' Free-speech law protects it.
1. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2355 (2000) ("It seems that what is amiss with First Amendment doctrine is not
so much the absence of common ground about how communication within our society ought constitutionally to be ordered, as it is our inability to formulate clear explanations and coherent rules
capable of elucidating and charting the contours of this ground." (emphasis added)); Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REv.1765, 1768 (2004) ("[E]ven the briefest glimpse at the vast universe of
widely accepted content-based restrictions on communication reveals that the speech with which the
First Amendment deals is the exception and the speech that may routinely be regulated is the rule."
(emphasis added)); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ.
L. REV. 439, 450 (1995) ("[T]he Court has held that cheap and convenient modes of communication
may not be eliminated wholesale." (emphasis added)); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the
Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1304 (2005) ("Under nearly every theory of free
speech, the right to free speech is at its core the right to communicate-to persuade and to inform
people through the content of one's message." (emphasis added)).
2. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (holding that a law punishing the
destruction of draft cards was constitutional because it condemned the act's "noncommunicative"
impact).
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Smart people tell us that the Internet should be structured to promote it.3 But

no one-no scholar or judge-has successfully captured it. Few have even
tried.
The following acts are communicative enough to be covered by the First
Amendment 4: playing music,' painting abstract figures, 6 marching in a

Hibernian pride parade,7 watching and showing movies,8 dancing in the

nude and watching nude dancing (barely), 9 picketing (sometimes),' ° posting

computer source code," and burning a flag or draft card."
Compare these communicative acts to a list of noncommunicative acts:
violence, 3 drug use, 4 subliminal advertising,' 5 refusing
to allow
military
7
6
recruiters on campus in protest of a government policy,1 and sex.
What's the difference between the first list and the second? Nobody
knows. There are a few proposed distinctions, but none bear any scrutiny,
and few have been seriously championed. The law nominally protects acts
that are "expressive," but rarely defines that word. When a definition is provided, it does not capture what it seeks to-any reasonable definition of
"expressive" would include sex and violence, which can be deeply
3.
TOWARDS

See generally

YOCHAI BENKLER, PROPERTY, COMMONS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:

A CORE COMMON

INFRASTRUCTURE

(2001), available at http://www.benkler.org/

WhitePaper.pdf.
4. For ease of reference, I will use the term First Amendment throughout this Article to
refer only to the Amendment's Free Speech Clause.
5. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) ("Music, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.").
6. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
569 (1995).
7.

Id. at 570.

8.

Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-03 (1952).

9.

City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000).

10. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940). But see Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951).
11.

Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 448 (2d Cir. 2001).

12.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404-06 (1989); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
376 (1968).
13.
NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) ("The First Amendment
does not protect violence.").
14. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (holding that the religious-ceremonial use of peyote was "unconnected with any communicative
activity").
15.
Vance v. Judas Priest, Nos. 86-5844 & 86-3939, 1990 WL 130920, at *4 (Nev. Dist. Ct.
Aug. 24, 1990) ("[S]ubliminal stimuli do not constitute speech."). But cf Zamora v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199, 206-07 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (holding that the First Amendment barred
plaintiff's claim that viewing violent television caused him to commit violence).
16.

Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006).

17. James Allon Garland, Breaking the Enigma Code: Why the Law Has Failed to Recognize
Sex as Expressive Conduct Under the First Amendment, and Why Sex Between Men Proves That It
Should, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 159, 196 (2003) ("[N]o court has ever recognized sex as a form of
expressive conduct .... ). But cf Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (describing sex as
"expression" that is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty).
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expressive but are not seen as expression covered by the First Amendment.
The same is true of other phrases used to describe First Amendment coverage, such as "the First Amendment protects the communication of ideas."'8
We aren't really sure what "ideas" are, but whatever they are, music and
nude dancing don't convey them.
Some scholars argue that communicative acts are those directed at the
mind and not the body,' 9 but activities like psychotropic-drug use and subliminal advertising are directed at the mind and still not protected from
regulation. Other scholars argue that philosophers like Ludwig Wittgenstein
and J.L. Austin, who argued against a formalist understanding of language,
can show us which acts are communicative.2 0 But no scholar has explained
how this work can be used to identify activities that are not communicative.
And while other scholars assert that communicative acts are those that serve
First Amendment values, there is no agreement as to which First Amendment value is paramount. 2' Nor has anybody explained how any one value
could be used to distinguish between communication and noncommunication, as any value would also be furthered by some noncommunicative acts.
In short, we got nothing.
This Article fills the gap, providing the first viable legal definition of
communication. Instead of worrying about "expression," or "ideas," or
"mind," or "values," I will argue, we should be asking about free will. In
determining what communication is, we are engaging our intuitions about
free will. More specifically, we are engaging our intuitions about freely
willed mental responses. By this I mean that communication occurs when
Person A tries to convey a thought-some idea or feeling-to Person B, and
Person B can freely choose whether to accept that thought. An act is communicative, in other words, if the important change that A wants to make in
B's mind occurs only when B wills it to.
In this Article, I will develop and defend this theory-the free-will theory of communication. In Part I, I will articulate a coarse definition of
communication, one that weeds out all the easy cases, and then argue that
the coarse definition is overinclusive. I will then argue that the free-will theory defines communication more accurately than any of the four existing
theories: (1) that communication is behavior that conveys ideas, (2) that
communication is behavior that primarily impacts the mind, (3) that communication can be understood in reference to linguistic philosophy, and (4)
that communication is behavior that conveys thoughts and causes limited
harm.

18.
1999.

One World One Family Now v. City of Miami Beach, 175 F.3d 1282, 1285 (1 1th Cir.)

19. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Resurrecting Free Speech, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 983
(1995) (noting that a traditional understanding of the First Amendment is that it protects speech,
which involves the mind, rather than conduct, which involves the body).
20.

See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.

21.
See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 964, 990-91 (1978).
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In Part II, I will discuss the free-will theory of communication in the
context of First Amendment law and theory. I will argue that theorists who
attempt to derive a theory of communication by looking only at First
Amendment values-meaning justifications for free speech-will inevitably
fail, but that the free-will theory is nonetheless consistent with a multiplevalue approach. I will go on to argue that current speech-conduct law is incoherent and that the free-will theory could clarify it: in particular, it could
solve problems by refining content-neutrality analysis. I will then apply my
theory to two sets of free-speech cases: the nude-dancing cases and cases
governing the publication of computer-programming code.
In the Conclusion I very briefly explore the broader implications of the
free-will theory, arguing that it can help us learn when to treat virtual worlds
as real, reimagine the relationship between communication and the body,
and prepare us for new technologies that we will not know how to classify
under existing free-speech theory.
I.

EXPLORATION: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO COMMUNICATE?

A. The Coarse Definition of CommunicationIs Inadequate
I argue here that the existing definitions of communication don't work,
by which I mean that they don't predict what either doctrine or intuition say
communication is. But first, I will suss out a coarse definition of communication, one that will weed out behavior that is undisputedly not
communicative, but that will ultimately prove overinclusive.
Communication is made up of things like talking and writing and painting and making movies. We can note, as a start, that all these things are
meant to convey a state of mind-an idea or feeling or emotion-from one
person to another. To this we can add that the act must be reasonably recognizable as intended to convey thoughts. If, for instance, Fred drops a
bowling ball off his roof to protest a treaty, he has not communicated disapproval even if he really meant to. Communication, in other words, requires
use of conventional means to convey a state of mind.
We can say, then, that communicative acts are those intended to convey
mental states and performed in ways that are reasonably understood to be
for that purpose. I'll call this definition-acts meant to convey thoughts
done through means reasonably recognizable as serving that end-the
"coarse" definition of communication, because it is useful but overinclusive.
Let me also note that some scholars define communication (or its equivalent) in almost exactly this way, 22 presumably reasoning that this is as
precise a definition as we can get.
To test out the coarse definition, let's apply it to the following cases:
1. A doctor prescribes Prozac for a patient.

22. See, e.g., David McGowan, From Social Friction to Social Meaning: What Expressive
Uses of Code Tell Us About Free Speech, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1515, 1524-25 (2003).
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2.

Person A takes a hit of ecstasy. A tries to explain to B what taking the
drug feels like. Finding that words are insufficient, A gives B some of
the drug.

3.

A nude erotic dancer dances onstage in front of a customer.

4.

An erotic dancer gives a customer a lap dance without touching him.

5.

An erotic dancer gives a customer a lap dance and rubs the customer
while dancing.

6.

A movie theater splices a single frame advertising popcorn into a film,
which raises popcorn sales even though viewers don't realize they have
seen the frame.

7.

A sadist uses torture techniques that cause no lasting physical harm on
a willing masochist as part of a role-playing fantasy.

These examples, I will argue, show the limits of the coarse definition because under that definition they all should be considered communication•
.
23
even though they are not, in fact, generally considered communicative.
Consider the first example: a doctor prescribes Prozac for a patient. Intuitively, that doesn't seem like communication. Indeed, no one has argued
that the right to make, prescribe, or take drugs is protected by the First
Amendment. Still, the coarse definition of communication includes any act
that is primarily intended to convey a state of mind and does so in a way that
is conventionally for that purpose. And the very point of Prozac is to alter
thoughts; it made Eli Lilly a lot of money doing that. Put another way, Prozac is like a novel: it wants to change your mind. So the acts of making and
taking Prozac would be considered communication under the coarse definition. The problem is that they're not communicative.
Of course, one might say that making or taking Prozac isn't speech because it can cause harm. But speech can cause harm--consider those
famous Skokie Nazis, whose right to march was covered by the First
Amendment.14 They could have caused a lot of harm: fear and anger and so
forth. So harm by itself can't be the answer. Still, it might be that Prozac
potentially causes more harm. But saying this misses the fact that Prozac
seems categorically different from Nazi parades-not subject to the same
speech-harm balancing test. It is extremely unlikely, for example, that psychotropic drug use would be deemed speech even if the drug undisputedly
caused no harm. Taking drugs is noncommunicative, in other words, regard25
less of the harm it causes.
Another possible objection to the Prozac example is that communication
occurs when a person has a thought and tries to pass the same thought to
another person. Even though the folks at Eli Lilly intended Prozac to change
people's minds-and to do so in a way that is recognized for that purpose23.

Nude dancing is an exception.

24.

Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977).

25. Still, this is one possible definition of communication that we should consider going
forward: acts are communicative when they convey thoughts and don't cause too much harm.
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it is not conveying a mental state that they themselves are experiencing. In
other words, you might say that someone communicates when she has a
thought and tries to pass the same thought to another person. But people
convey states of mind they don't experience all the time-when they lie, for
instance. And although lying may not be protected communication, it does
seem like a kind of communication. One can also imagine situations in
which a person conveys a thought without knowing what it is. If, for instance, a poet creates a computer program that randomly writes poetry, and
it happens to produce a poem that is critical of the government, nothing in
First Amendment law suggests that the government could suppress the poem
because the poet wasn't really thinking about its content.
Here let me add that this requirement-of equivalence between the mental state of the speaker and the thought potentially conveyed to a listenerseems to be what the word "expression" is getting at. Literally, "expression"
denotes getting something Out, 26 and in the First Amendment context, the
thing expressed must be the mental state of the communicator. But to be
communicative, an act doesn't need to express a state of mind that the actor
is truly experiencing. Consider a nude dancer. Her free-speech rights don't
disappear if she is thinking about the drive home while dancing. This means,
then, that the word "expression" is inappropriate, because it implies that the
speaker must think 27or feel what she is communicating-a requirement that
doesn't really exist.
The second example addresses this problem directly: a drug user gives
ecstasy to her friend so her friend can experience the same state of mind.
This use of drugs, then, is expressive. But few would call it communicative,
and no judge would classify it as speech.
Examples three, four, and five all involve erotic dancing: one from a distance, one up close without touching, and one up close with touching. All
these acts are meant to change minds by causing arousal, which is a mental
phenomenon. But only the first act-nude dancing-is covered by the First
Amendment, and then only barely. 28 But the purpose and content of erotic
dancing and erotic rubbing are the same: to arouse. It therefore seems that
all three acts should be treated the same way. Of course, erotic rubbing
might be more likely to lead to actual prostitution or other undesirable

26.

The first definition of expression is the "[a]ct or product of pressing out."
899 (2d ed. 1934).

WEBSTER'S

NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

27. And while there probably is a requirement that the speaker intend to invoke a mental
state in others, intending to make someone feel a certain way and feeling that way yourself are two
different things. Certainly one can imagine a pole dancer who intends to arouse her customers without herself feeling aroused.
28. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (noting that nude dancing is
"expressive conduct" but that regulations "unrelated to the suppression" thereof are weighed against
a "less stringent" standard (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)); see also supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
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outcomes, but that is because it is a very effective form of communication,
not because it isn't meant to convey a mental state.29
The sixth example involves subliminal advertising in a movie theater.
Assume that subliminal advertising works. 3° Under the coarse definition, this
ad must be speech. "I want popcorn," is, after all, a state of mind. Subliminal advertising conveys "I want popco"-an idea-through language, and
conveying an idea through language is the paradigmaticinstance of communication in typical First Amendment discourse." Subliminal advertising
therefore seems like it should be communication. But subliminal advertising
32
is generally not covered by the First Amendment.
The final example, a sadomasochistic mock torture session, should also
be communicative under the coarse definition. Pain, after all, is a mental
state. The torturer in this hypothetical is therefore conveying a mental
state-pain-without causing physical harm or using physical coercion.
And yet it would seem a category mistake to call this act "communicative."
One doesn't "communicate" physical pain in the ordinary sense of the word.
Nor is there any reason to think that this act would be covered by the First
Amendment.
All seven examples, then, should be communicative acts under the
coarse definition of communication. But none except nude dancing are covered by the First Amendment, and none except nude dancing intuitively
seem like communication.
The free-will theory of communication explains why. These acts are not
communicative because they are intended to convey mental states regardless
of the recipient's will. When someone takes Prozac or ecstasy, her ability to
experience the mental state the drug is supposed to produce does not turn on
an act of will. We would not say to a friend, "This drug will get you high if
you really think about it." Similarly, subliminal advertising is thought to
persuade a person whether they want it to or not. And erotic rubbing is
treated differently than erotic viewing because, of the two, rubbing is harder
to experience without becoming aroused.
To the coarse definition, then, I am adding a new piece-one that has
never been articulated before. The coarse definition says that communicative
29. One could also distinguish rubbing by saying it is a bodily act. But rubbing doesn't
change or damage the body the way that sex might (for example, through HIV transmission). So
when we say that rubbing is a bodily act, what we mean is not that it changes the body but that it
conveys thoughts through touch, which is a different sense than sight. But it would make no sense to
distinguish communication by the particular sense that receives the communication. See infra Conclusion. Certainly we wouldn't say that reading Braille is not communicative because it involves
touch and not sight.
30.

It may not. Nicole Grattan Pearson, Note, Subliminal Speech: Is It Worthy of First

Amendment Protection?,4 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 775, 788-93 (1995).

By this I mean that there is no question whether the act that the government seeks to
31.
regulate is communicative when the act uses language. See, e.g., N.Y Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (noting that advertisements depicting the behavior of public officials are speech
under the First Amendment).
32. See, e.g., Vance v. Judas Priest, Nos. 86-5844 & 86-3939, 1990 WL 130920, at *4 (Nev.
Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 1990).
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acts are primarily intended to convey a state of mind and are reasonably recognizable as serving that purpose. But this is not enough. The important and
desired change of mind must be effectuated through the listener's will.
B. The Free-Will Theory Elaborated
In the previous Section, we saw that the coarse definition of communication and the concept of expression failed to explain why some acts-those
that changed minds in ways the listener couldn't reject-weren't communicative. This suggested an additional requirement: that the thought conveyed
can only be effectuated through the will of the listener.
We are now in a position to elaborate a bit on this proposal. First, although the concept of freely willed responses may seem obscure, it isn't.
This appeal to freely willed mental responses is most evident in argument,
which is core First Amendment activity. When someone is arguing, her goal
is not just to have her voice heard. Her goal, instead, is to convince someone-to change the listener's mind. But the listener can only be convinced
through her own free will. My thesis is that we should treat this quality, of
working through the free will of the listener, to be the sine qua non of communication, whether linguistic or not.
Second, let me clarify that I use the phrase "freely willed mental response" to limit the scope of my proposed definition (as the use of the word
"mental" indicates) to acts that the listener can control her response to solely
through mental effort. In other words, these are acts whose most important
effects can be resisted even when they are physically completed. For instance, one can hear an argument and choose whether to agree with it, or
watch a play and choose whether to be moved by it. Psychotropic drugs, on
the other hand, are not communicative, because people who take drugs can't
choose whether to be affected by them (although one could freely choose
not to take drugs).33
Third, I have described communicative acts as those whose most "important" effects are effectuated only through the freely willed mental
responses of others. Every act has multiple effects, both physical and mental, and the communication analysis focuses on the most significant one.
Persuading someone, for instance, has many physical effects, such as moving some air molecules around, and many mental effects, such as putting the
33. My justification for this distinction is primarily descriptive. Communication doesn't
encompass acts (consider drug use and sex) whose most important effects cannot be willfully
avoided by those who engage in them. But the distinction holds up normatively as well. The First
Amendment does not create a simple right to individual communicative autonomy-a right to say
only what you want to say and hear only what you want to hear. In some cases, it enables others to
impinge on communicative autonomy by granting them the right to make people hear things they do
not want to, as when unpopular speakers are granted the right to hold forth in a public place. See
Nat'l Socialist Party v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977). Obviously such a grant could never
be extended to acts whose most important effects, when completed, overran the listener's will. There
is no First Amendment right to touch someone sexually against her will, even when such touching is
in the public sphere (for example, on a street corner). Nor should there be a right to broadcast subliminal messages at someone to make them join a certain political party, even though such an act
would involve no physical coercion.
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sound of one's words in the listener's head and invoking comprehension.
The first mental effect, hearing a speaker's words, is unwilled. The second,
comprehension, is probably also unwilled in that the normal listener experiences it whether she wants to or not. But the next effect, agreement, is only
brought about through the will of the listener. This effect is the focus of the
analysis, and the one that I call "important."
It follows that a lot turns on the term "important, '' 14 a term which is so
far undefined and perhaps indefinable. This term denotes a pragmatic analysis that cannot be reduced to a simple formula. That fact notwithstanding, in
most cases the most important effect-the one that is the subject of the
analysis-is easily identified. The aim of argument is to persuade; the aim
of music is to make the listener feel a certain way; the aim of erotic dancing
is to arouse.
One can imagine more complicated scenarios, but few that would cause
problems in practice. If I decided to convince a friend to support gun-safety
laws by shooting him in the neck with a BB gun, I would be inducing
pain-an unwilled mental state-with the aim of producing agreement, a
willed mental state. But if I were to argue that my act was protected by the
First Amendment because inducing pain was only a means to convince my
(by now former) friend, I would lose, and no one would find my argument
plausible. Pain is an important effect, one that we care about a great deal.
The pain itself is therefore the focus of the analysis even when it is used to
convince somebody. In most cases, then, the importance requirement will be
uncontroverted.
C. Analysis of Existing Theories
So far, I have articulated the coarse definition of communication, argued
that the coarse definition is broadly correct but overinclusive and therefore
inadequate, and proposed a new element to the coarse definition-namely,
that communicative behaviors are those whose most important effects are
reasonably intended to be brought about through freely willed responses of
others. In this Section, I will test the free-will theory against existing theories of communication and show that the free-will theory more accurately
describes communication-that is, that it better aligns with First Amendment cases and common intuition. Although I will refer to First Amendment
doctrine as I proceed, I will hold off on fully reconciling my theory with the
First Amendment until I have finished making my case in the abstract, because I fear that prematurely descending into free-speech law will only lead
us down dark paths from whence we will be unable to retrace our steps.
There are, I will argue, four theories of communication, although this
number is somewhat arbitrary. Indeed, the jurisprudence presents an enormous amount of language about communication-and its fellow travelers

34. The word "important" is, I think, the fight one, not because it perfectly predicts precisely
which thought is at issue, but because it is expansive enough to encompass all the relevant factors.
Indeed, any more technical term would suggest a precision that the analysis itself lacks.
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"expression" and "protected speech"-but few coherent theories.3" Surveying the literature, one is likely to find phrases like "the First Amendment
protects the communication of ideas" or "the First Amendment protects ex-

pression" without any examination of what "ideas" and "expression" are. 1,6
To some degree, then, I am only identifying strains of rhetoric, but these
strains do cohere into arguments that are worth considering.
The first such argument is that communication is the conveyance of
"ideas." The second is that communication is behavior that goes to the mind
and not the body. The third is that communication can be understood in reference to linguistic philosophy, and in particular the philosophy of J.L.
Austin. The fourth, as I noted earlier, is that communication is behavior that

conveys states of mind and doesn't cause too much harm.
All these theories, I will argue, are terribly wrong.
1. Communication Is Not Just the Conveyance of Ideas
Frequently, behavior is said to be covered by the First Amendment if it
conveys "ideas" or "information." This theory, which I will call "ideaism,"
does not withstand much scrutiny. It is, perhaps, sufficient refutation of this
theory to note that nobody who uses it will define "ideas" or "information."
But it is worth thinking about these terms; doing so will focus the inquiry
and provide a vocabulary for the debate.37 This effort is limited to roughly
mapping out how the ideas are used in those First Amendment cases in
which courts have tried to operationalize them.38
35.
There are, of course, some exceptions to this. See, e.g., Miller v. Civil City of South
Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring), rev'd sub nom. Bames v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (articulating Posner's theory of "expressive" behavior).
36. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he First Amendment was meant to guarantee freedom to express and communicate
ideas .... ).
37. Before considering ideaism, let me note that I will not look at the word "symbolic,"
which, although it shows up often in the First Amendment context, is far too squirrelly to use productively. Think about two uses for the word. The first is the sense in which words and letters could
be called "symbols," in the way that the written phrase "Stop the war" is communication effectuated
through symbols. The second is the way that a physical item serves as a representative for something else, as when O'Brien's draft card was "symbolic" of the war. See United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). Without thinking too much about the tougher questions (for example,
what is a symbol? or what is the relationship between language and the world?), it should be clear
that the word "symbol" means different things in these two cases. But no one who uses the word
"symbol" in First Amendment cases will explain in what meaningful sense these two uses are alike.
See id. Using "symbol" is thus not a way to explain how covered acts are alike, but instead a way of
avoiding explaining how they are alike.
38. When I use the word "idea," I am not using it as it is used in copyright law, for two reasons. First, even in copyright cases, the term, which is distinguished from "expression," is
notoriously poorly defined: the prevailing consensus is that the best definition was provided by
Judge Learned Hand, and he noted only that ideas are more abstract than expression. See Alfred C.
Yen, A FirstAmendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's
"Total Concept and Feel", 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 405 (1989) ("Presently, the consensus view is that
Hand's attempt to solve the idea/expression dichotomy is the best effort to date." (citing Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930))). Second, the term is not used in the same
way across the two fields. In the First Amendment context, courts commonly use the term "expression" not in contrast to the term "ideas," but as a broader category that encompasses "ideas." See,
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Turning to "information" and "ideas," then, we can say that "information" is used to refer to things like sentences, mathematical formulas,
musical scores, computer code, and DNA strings. But it is not used to refer
to things like the sound of music or the way a picture looks. "Idea," on the
other hand, refers to mostly the same things-sentences, formulas, scores,
and so forth-with the added requirement that "idea" usually connotes a
mental phenomenon. Thus in the the ordinary sense of the phrase "he had a
good idea," "idea" denotes a mental state.39
The simple argument against ideaism is that it fails to predict what the

First Amendment actually covers. An ideaist view of the First Amendment
would exclude covered activities like music and nonsymbolic art. Dance
performances, 4° abstract art,4' instrumental music, 42 and narrative are cov-

ered by the First Amendment, but don't convey ideas. a" And if "idea" is read
to denote these things, the term just means "mental state," and ideaism

merely recapitulates the coarse definition of communication. If instrumental
music conveys ideas, then more or less everything must. It is true that music

has a formal vocabulary (song form, for instance). But so do most human
activities, like manufacturing automobiles. If one can talk about the debt

e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) ("Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates [is] ...political expression ...").Instead, I am trying to get at how the
terms are used in First Amendment cases in which their meaning might affect the outcome, as happens for example in the code cases. See infra Section 1.E.2.
39. I offer definitions of these terms, noting first that while these definitions are probably
generally inadequate (they fail to capture every usage and are not informed by extralegal literature),
they will at least let you know what I'm talking about. We can think of "information," then, as a
series of elements drawn from a limited set of elements that is useful because it is arranged in a
particular way. A sentence is a sequence of marks drawn from a limited set of elements (the alphabet). These elements are useful when arranged in the proper sequence, but not otherwise. If I were to
rearrange the letters in a sentence, I might have nonsense. The same is true of any of the examples in
our list of things "information" refers to: programming code, DNA, mathematical formulas, and so
on.
An "idea," in contrast, is a thought expressed in an information system. In other words, ideas
are arrangements of elements that people can think in and that have meaning in a particular information system. Most ideas are in language, but people can think in other information systems as well
(mathematical formulas, musical notation, and so forth). Notice, then, that not all information systems are idea systems. DNA, for instance, is an information system-limited elements usefully
arranged--but not an idea system. (Very few folks walk down the street thinking "AGCT GCAT,"
although one can encode language as DNA and vice versa.) But because language is the paradigm
example of communication and because information systems tend to resemble each other, there may
be a tendency to think of all uses of information as communicative. In fact, this confusion is
influencing the programming-code cases. See infra Section I.E.2.
40.
41.
(1995).
42.
43.

City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000).
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569
Id.
These need not necessarily be linguistic.

44. Judge Posner has made this point eloquently. See Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904
F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) ("[Elven if 'thought,' 'concept,' 'idea,' and
,opinion' are broadly defined, these are not what most music conveys; and even if music is regarded
as a language, it is not a language for encoding ideas and opinions."), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
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Schoenberg owes Beethoven, one can also talk about the debt the 2005 Mustang owes the Mach 1. Building a car still isn't speech.
Ideaists might argue that the First Amendment's protection of music,
paintings, art, and dance is either a mistake or a de minimis exception. Most
don't, however, and as a doctrinal matter, it seems unthinkable that these
protections could be rolled back and silly to argue that so broad and meaningful a swath of human behavior is de minimis. "A rule cannot be laid
down that would excommunicate the paintings of Degas. ' 5
Ideaism thus improperly excludes large areas of nonlinguistic behavior
from communication. But even if the First Amendment protected only language, ideaism would still be wrong. Language itself obviously conveys
more than ideas. Consider how much of language does not survive translation, how much is conveyed through timing or tone of voice (as when one is
flirting or telling a joke). Imagine a law providing that the text of rousing
political speeches could be reproduced but that video and audio tapes of the
speeches were illegal. Transcripts of Martin Luther King Jr.'s speeches
would be in legal circulation, but the recordings would not. Wouldn't such a
law offend the First Amendment, even if it were idea neutral? 46 How, then,
can we say that the First Amendment covers only "ideas" or "information"?
2. Communication Is Not Just Behavior that Goes to the Mind
Some First Amendment scholars have argued that speech is behavior
that goes to the mind while conduct is behavior that changes the physical
realm-that goes to the "body."47 "Mind" here means everything a person
experiences in his or her head: pain, for instance, or love, or thoughts about
the quadratic formula. The physical realm-the "body" in the literature-is
everything that is physically out there: cheese, Yugos, the Indian Ocean, and
so on. I will call this view "mentalism." Although mentalism misses the
mark, it does so in ways that are more interesting than ideaism.
A trivial objection to mentalism is that every communicative act uses the
body. Books are made of paper, conversation of breath, and so forth. Indeed,
any communication causes physical responses in the recipient-reading a
book causes eyeballs to move and synapses to fire. So when the mentalist
says communication "goes to the mind," what she means is that the physical
consequences of communication are incidentalto the mental changes. What
matters first about a book is that it can change your mind, not that it causes
paper cuts. A sword is primarily important for its value in causing cuts, so
using a sword isn't a speech act.

45.

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).

46. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54 (1994) (noting that a law that "completely
foreclose[s] a venerable means of communication" may be unconstitutional even if content neutral).
47. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 442 ("The distinction between mind and body, speech and
conduct, expression and action, holds that speech is privileged above conduct; government may
regulate the clash of bodies but not the stirring of hearts and minds.").
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But not all behaviors intended to change people's minds are communicative. As per our previous examples, erotic rubbing, drugs, and subliminal
advertising are all both mind altering and noncommunicative. And here you
might say that in these acts, the mental change is incidental to the physical
change. But the physical change caused by erotic rubbing or swallowing a
pill is no more incidental than that caused by reading. And subliminal advertising causes exactly the same physical changes as normal advertising, but is
not communicative.
These examples get to the problem with the mentalist view. There are
many behaviors that people undertake intending to create a mental phenomenon in others, but that are not speech because the response they
provoke is beyond the recipient's control. Prozac changes the mind without
the participation of the person who takes it; the same is true of subliminal
advertising. To be communicative, an act must effectuate not just any mental
changes, but freely willed mental changes. This explains why language is the
paradigm of communication. Mental responses to language are rarely involuntary. If Person A tries to persuade Person B-or comfort her, or woo her,
or what have you-B need not feel as A wants. B will be persuaded or comforted or wooed as she pleases. Her mental response will thus be freely
willed. But linguistic activity is only correlatedwith this quality of producing free responses, not synonymous with it.
Language that does not produce free mental responses is therefore not
communicative. We can test this hypothesis with a simple thought experiment. Imagine a man who, using spells, could always convince listeners of
what he wanted to. Let's call him the Sorcerer. Through television appearances, the Sorcerer forces the American people to appoint him king, scrap
our constitutional democracy, and cancel all the good TV shows. He obviously threatens all of the classical First Amendment values: deliberative
democracy, individual autonomy, the marketplace of ideas, and so forth.
Eventually some soldiers with earplugs detain him and gag him. He then
argues (via text messaging, I guess) that preventing him from using his
spells violates his First Amendment rights.
So would you, dear reader, go to court to defend his right to cast spells?
If you were an ideaist or mentalist, you would have to, because he has done
nothing but change people's minds by conveying ideas. If you think he
should stay gagged, then you must reject these theories.
The point of this silly hypothetical 48 is that it is people's capacity to respond freely that is the sine qua non of communication. This quality of free
response is not epiphenomenal; it is the thing itself. In truth, it is the other
qualities usually thought to mark communication-the use of ideas, reason,
information, or appeals to the mind-that are epiphenomenal. If we remove

48. But it's not that silly. Subliminal speech is a minor, real-life instantiation of the Sorcerer
hypothetical. So is (language-based) brainwashing.
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the reliance on the listener's 49will, then the act is not communicative, no matter what else is true about it.
3. Communication Does Not Consist Only of IllocutionaryActs
Beyond mentalism, a significant strain in First Amendment scholarship
tries to solve speech-conduct problems by referencing nonlegal theory, most
often linguistic philosophy. The most invoked names are Austin and
Wittgenstein.
Reading these two philosophers, one can see why free-speech scholars
like them so much. Legal scholars are generally (and rightly) dissatisfied
with the existing theories of First Amendment coverage. They therefore tend
to argue that courts are overly formalistic in making speech-conduct decisions, meaning that they look too heavily at the form of the activity and not
enough at its purpose or the context in which it is used.50 These scholars
push two related themes: antiformalism and contextualism. Antiformalism
proposes that in identifying communication, current doctrine unduly emphasizes form over function; contextualism proposes that the law should focus
on the circumstances surrounding the putatively protected behavior to see if
it is communicative.
Austin and Wittgenstein fit in perfectly with the agenda of antiformalist
scholars. Both philosophers showed that language didn't work in just one
way-that it could work in different ways and have different effects in different contexts.5' And here the problem shows itself already. Taking it as true
that language does do different things depending on the context in which it
is used, how can one use this datum to fashion a rule that defines communication? Knowing that there is no unitary theory of language-that it does
different things in different contexts--can only tell us how not to define
communication. Of course it is true that we can only tell whether an act is
communicative by looking at its use in context. But in that context, what the
hell are we looking for?
Legal scholars who cite linguistic philosophers, therefore, inevitably end
up doing little more than restating the coarse definition of communication."
49. My sense is that this is what people are getting at when they refer to the mind-body
distinction. But if so, they are using the word "mind" in a way it has never been used before.
50. See McGowan, supra note 22, at 1525-26; Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech
Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 629, 633-34 (2000).
51.
Of course this summary is grossly reductionist. I am speaking of Wittgenstein's later
writing, which the legal scholars I am arguing against rely on. In PhilosophicalInvestigations, for
instance, Wittgenstein's rejection of a unitary theory of language is clear. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 1, 11-15, 23-27, 107, 108, 308 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d
ed. 1958); see also ROBERT J. FOGELIN, WITTGENSTEIN 107-43 (2d ed. 1987). Austin's work focuses on the effect that context can have on the nature of the speech act performed. See generally
J.L. AUSTIN, HOW To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed. 1975).
52. McGowan, for example, in a passage in which he cites, among others, Austin, Post,
Wittgenstein, and Searle, states:
Expression is produced through social understandings speakers and listeners bring to bear on
conduct they recognize as expressive....
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Granted, there is some utility to this, insofar as it beats back more formal
conceptions, like ideaism. But as we have already seen, the coarse definition
is inadequate.
To make this point, let me demonstrate how using Austin's work to define communication produces the wrong result. I choose Austin both
because he is a wonderful writer and because he is a favorite of First
Amendment scholars.53 Making this demonstration requires using Austin's
vocabulary, one that is alien to legal discourse. But it is worth learning these
terms, if only to see how little they add to the communication debate.
Austin articulated three kinds of speech acts: locutionary, illocutionary,
54
and perlocutionary. These categories capture different ways in which a
single speech act can work. Locutionary acts convey "sense and reference."55
"utterances which have a certain (conventional)
Illocutionary acts are
51
,,5
force.' 56 Perlocutionary acts are speech acts that achieve something.
To illustrate these terms, let me give an example. Imagine that I was
considering walking into a bar, but my friend Veronica persuaded me not to.
Later, I relate this conversation to a different person, my friend Logan. If I
said, "Veronica said, 'Don't go into the bar,'" I would be describing the locutionary act, the simple meaning of what was said. If I said, "Veronica
urged me not to go into the bar," I would be describing the illocutionary act,
the type of speech act that was performed taking context into account. If I

For expression to work, both speakers and listeners must understand the practices and
conventions they employ as expressive. A person walking to work is not speaking, but a
parade marcher is....
The context in which expression occurs is an unspoken element of the dialogue between
speakers and listeners.

McGowan, supra note 22, at 1524-25 (footnote call numbers omitted). In other words, acts are
expressive when, taken in context, people know they are expressive.
53. Austin is famous for arguing that language cannot only describe things, but can actually
do things. See AUSTIN, supra note 51, at 94. For example, when a speaker swings a bottle of champagne at a boat and says, "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth" she is not describing a christening
but performing one. Id. at 5. Appropriately enough, Austin calls these verbal acts "performatives."
Some First Amendment scholars, most eloquently Kent Greenawalt, have used this distinction to
map out First Amendment coverage in ways that, while interesting, won't help us define communication. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 58-59 (1989).
Greenawalt argues that a category of linguistic behavior that he calls "situation-altering utterances"
is not covered by the First Amendment. Id. at 239.
54. See, e.g., Fadi Hanna, Gay Self-Identification and the Right to Political Legibility, 2006
Wis. L. REV. 75, 79-84 (arguing that coming out of the closet effectuates all three of Austin's
speech acts); B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the
Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 512 (2005); Heidi M. Hurd, Expressing Doubts About
Expressivism, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL E 405, 419. And these are only a few of the many articles that
reference Austin's speech-act theory.
55.

AUSTIN, supra note 5 1, at 109.

56. Id. If this definition seems obtuse to you, don't worry. It seems obtuse to me too, as it did
to Austin. See id. at 99 ("I am not suggesting that this is a clearly defined class by any means."). And
if he has trouble defining illocutionary acts, what hope is there for judges?
57.

Id. at 109.
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said, "Veronica persuadedme not to go into the bar," I would be describing
the perlocutionary act, the act that was achieved."
In other words, saying is a locutionary act, urging is an illocutionary act,
and persuading is a perlocutionary act. Because these terms describe different ways of looking at a single speech event, the same locutionary act can,
depending on the circumstances, have different illocutionary effects. (And
this is simply a fancy way of saying that words with the same sense and reference can be used to do different things.) If, for instance, I said, "Don't
shoot me!" to someone who was shooting at me, I would be pleading; if I
said "Don't shoot me!" while rehearsing a play, I would be rehearsing a
play. In both cases, the locutionary act-the referential sense of the wordsis the same. And if I didn't get shot, the physical effects would be the same
as well. But the illocutionary acts would be different: pleading for one's life
is not the same as rehearsing a play.
Focusing on the illocutionary act thus promotes antiformalism and contextualism, directing the analysis toward speech's meaning in a particular
context. This has led some scholars, including Lee Tien, to argue that the
communication analysis should focus on illocutionary impact59:
For First Amendment purposes, the relevant intent is the speaker's intent
that the hearer understand the act as a speech act-particularly as an illocutionary act. But the Supreme Court thinks of meaning mainly as
propositional content. Without illocutionary force, a speech act is either
propositional or perlocutionary, and the speaker can only have propositional or perlocutionary intent. 6°
Tien also suggests that communication should be understood as successful
completion of the illocutionary act. 6' But this method will never do to define
communication. In practice, it would mean that when faced with a speechconduct question, a court would ask whether the speaker did something that
is conventionally done with words. If Person A brandished a knife at Person
B, for instance, the court would ask, "Was A threatening B?" Because
threatening is an illocutionary act-something that can be done with
words-the brandishing would be communicative. But brandishing a knife
is normally an assault, which isn't covered by the First Amendment. But
under Tien's theory, it should be; or at least Tien's theory does nothing to
explain why assault wouldn't be covered.

58.

See id.

59. Tien focuses more on Searle's work than he does on Austin's. See Tien, supra note 50, at
639-43. Searle's philosophy, as described by Tien, is amenable to the same criticisms as Austin's.
60.

Id. at 651.

61.

Tien has proposed the following test:

First, the speaker must intend that the hearer grasp illocutionary intent. Second, the meaning
that matters is utterance meaning. Third, the actor must intend that the hearer grasp the illocutionary force through the hearer's knowledge of the conventions that govem meaning and
intent, which requires an internal connection between the two.
Id. at 650.
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Nor is Tien's theory merely overinclusive: it is also underinclusive, because it assumes that all nonlinguistic communication has an illocutionary
effect-a conventional force-that maps onto language. But not all nonlinguistic communication aspires to work as language does. What is the
illocutionary force of a concerto? It has none. A concerto doesn't want to be
a play; it's just a different way of conveying feelings. In other words, trying
to define communication by focusing on the illocutionary force of nonlinguistic communication doesn't explain why nonlinguistic behavior is
communicative when it works differently than language, which it sometimes
surely does.
4. Communication Does Not Consist Only of Behaviors that
Convey Thoughts and Cause More Good than Harm
One conceivable definition of communication is that it is made up of behaviors that fit the coarse definition-behaviors that convey thoughts in
recognized ways-but is limited by an anti-harm principle or some form of
pragmatic cost-benefit analysis. Under this theory, behaviors like assault and
sex and drug use are distinguishable from speech only because they are
more likely to cause harm; or, in Posner's formulation, they are regulable
because the harm prevented by regulation outweighs the value of the speech
62
thereby suppressed.
I agree with Posner that cost-benefit analysis does influence-and in
some ways should influence-analysis of whether a particular speech act is
protected by the First Amendment. In the famous example, censoring disclosure of troop movements is permissible during war.63
Taking this is as true, one still can't capture the First Amendment by
saying that it protects "expressive" behavior that is pragmatically useful. 6
As I've noted, the category of "expressive" behavior doesn't get at what we
want, because it implies an equivalence between the mental state of the actor and the thought conveyed to the listener, which the law doesn't require. 65
But even substituting the coarse definition of communication-acts that
convey thought in ways reasonably meant to do so-the pragmatic view still
doesn't fully describe the law. This is because, as I noted earlier, there are
many behaviors that both fall under the coarse definition of communication
and are pragmatically useful but still aren't protected by the First Amendment. To revisit the earlier list, subliminal speech, drug use, and erotic
touching are all coarsely communicative and yet not covered by the First

62.

See generally Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK

U. L. REV. 1 (1986). Posner does not like the term cost-benefit balancing and prefers to call his view
pragmatic adjudication, although he concedes that his approach involves balancing. Richard A.
Posner, PragmatismVersus Purposivism in FirstAmendment Analysis, 54

40 (2002) [hereinafter Posner, Pragmatism].
63.

See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).

64.

See, e.g., Posner, Pragmatism,supra note 62, at 745.

65.

See supra Section I.A.

STAN.

L. REV. 737, 738-
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Amendment. 66 And here Posner might respond that these acts aren't pragmatically useful-that on balance they cause more harm than good. But this
misses the fact that there doesn't seem to be any balancing going on in these
cases. Indeed, we can hypothesize facts under which these acts are unquestionably net beneficial, but intuition still balks at the idea of protecting them
under the First Amendment. Even if there were a uniformly safe drug that
conveyed a wonderful state of mind-a sugar pill that induced visions of
cuddly ponies-nothing in our history or law suggests that taking the pill
would be deemed a speech act. Nor, I suspect, would a movie theater have a
constitutional right to subliminally order people to call their grandmothers if
they have a chance, despite the utility of such an order.
This is not to say that a pragmatic approach cannot inform the law; it is
only to say that an approach that fails to recognize the difference between
giving someone an opportunity to choose a state of mind and forcing her to
feel it can not fully capture the First Amendment.
II.

APPLICATION: THE FREE-WILL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

I have, so far, argued for a new definition of communication-what I
call the "free-will" theory of communication-whose central tenet is that
communicative acts are intended to invoke freely willed mental responses.
And although I have relied on First Amendment law in this analysis, I have
not yet attempted to fully integrate it with the existing doctrine and scholarship. I will do so now.
First, some clarifications. Before continuing, I need to distinguish between "coverage" and "protection" in the First Amendment context. 67 An act
is "covered" by the First Amendment when attempts to regulate it merely
invoke constitutional scrutiny; an act is "protected" by the First Amendment
when it is unconstitutional to regulate that act. Thus an act may be covered
by the First Amendment and still not protected. In this Article, I am primarily interested in coverage-in discovering when the First Amendment is
interested in a particular behavior, not whether it ultimately protects that
61
behavior.
I should add that a theory of communication is not by itself sufficient to
define First Amendment coverage. As Robert Post and Frederick Schauer

66.

Id.

67.

Frederick Schauer made this distinction first. Frederick Schauer, Categoriesand the First

Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 267, 270-73 (1981).

68. There is no hard and fast doctrinal line between protection and coverage, and courts
sometimes blur the two. But they are conceptually distinct. The protection determination is a matter
of balancing, while the coverage determination is categorical. Under the protection analysis, the
government can regulate a behavior if it has a good enough reason, or doesn't incidentally suppress
too much speech. This review is taken without the court's usual deference to legislative findings. But
the legislature can regulate uncovered activities without needing to survive balancing; it need demonstrate only a rational reason, and its conclusions are reviewed with deference. See Schauer, supra
note 1, at 1769-74.
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have noted, many communicative acts aren't covered.69 Product warnings,
contracts, and professional advice don't invoke the First Amendment, for
instance.7 ° Post argues that to be covered, an act must not only facilitate
communication but also further First Amendment values. 1 I find this argument convincing, although my larger thesis does not hinge on it. For the
purpose of understanding my argument, we need only understand that not
all communicative acts are covered.
Nonetheless, as I will argue, all covered acts must at least facilitate
communication. I will explore these themes further in the next Section,
which addresses First Amendment values.
A. The Free-Will Theory and FirstAmendment Values
There are a lot of First Amendment articles-an awful lot, actuallyabout values, with "values" meaning, roughly, justifications. Many are looking for the paramount value, the real reason for the First Amendment.7 2 But
considering the diverse practices covered by the First Amendment-arguing,
writing, marching, singing, erotic dancing-and the number of ends they
can be put to, identifying a single reason to protect speech seems unlikely.73
Nor is it clear why speech should be protected for only one reason. In other
contexts, it is not unusual to say that a law has been passed for several reasons; doing so doesn't make the law unenforceably indeterminate.
Nonetheless, values-based discourse dominates First Amendment theory,
and I need to locate my theory within that discourse.
Let us consider, then, how the free-will theory of communication fits in
with the values scholarship. "Values," as I noted, refers to reasons to have
the First Amendment. Accordingly, the values debate describes the ultimate
ends to which the Amendment should be put. "Communication," on the
other hand, describes a set of means-different ways of doing things. Some
scholars have argued that the means must be defined in terms of the endsin other words, that the First Amendment protects all behaviors that serve
First Amendment values.74
This approach is incorrect. Let me make an analogy to show why. Let's
consider a law that protects another set of practices-say, a law forbidding
the legislature to abridge "transportation." Like speech, transportation is
made up of a bunch of practices: driving, flying, train travel, and so on.
There could be several reasons for the transportation law. Protecting trans-

69.

Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH, L.J.

713, 715 (2000); see also Schauer, supranote 67.
70.

Post, supra note 69.

71.

Id. at 715-17.

72.

See, e.g., Baker, supra note 21, at 990-91; 0. Lee Reed, A Free Speech Metavalue for

the Next Millennium: Autonomy of Consciousness in FirstAmendment Theory and Practice, 35 AM.

Bus. L.J. 1, 2-4 (1997).
73.

Many others have made this point. See, e.g.,

74.

See, e.g., Baker, supra note 21.

GREENAWALT,

supra note 53, at 9-34.
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portation promotes individual autonomy, but also economic productivity. It
is also necessary for democracy, insofar as people can't get together without
it. When applying this law, judges would want to keep these reasons in
mind. The law would only cover behaviors that furthered these values; driving friends to work would be protected, but deliberately running over one's
enemies would not be. Behaviors would thus be covered when they were
both considered transportation and served the values behind the law.
But focusing on values cannot define transportation. Not only are there
many different "transportation values," but even if any single value were
used, the definition wouldn't fit, because other means would also serve that
end. Cars promote economic production, but so do computers and many
other things.
Just as "transportation" cannot be defined solely by looking at values,
neither can speech. If the First Amendment covered all behaviors that furthered any particular value-liberty, deliberative democracy, truth seekingit would be a very different law. Democracy requires free speech, but it also
requires a right to assembly, a right to liberty of movement, and so forth.
Free speech is good for truth seeking, but so is deep-sea exploration. The
latter just isn't speech.
To sum up, acts are covered by the First Amendment when they both facilitate communication and serve First Amendment values. There is no
single First Amendment value, however, and hence it is impossible to define
communication as all acts that further a particular value. Moreover, even if
there were a single First Amendment value, defining communication in
terms of that value would not produce a descriptive account.
This is not to diminish the work of authors who advocate for a conception of the First Amendment predicated on a single value. These pieces
amount to normative arguments in favor of different visions of the Amendment. But whatever the merits of these alternate conceptions, for our
purposes it is enough to see that any scholar whose work focuses solely on
values will inevitably end up either altering the contours of communication
or arguing that the communication requirement should be discarded altogether.
Consider, in this light, the work of C. Edwin Baker. Baker is one of the
most insightful advocates of a single-value view of the First Amendment.
He champions the liberty-autonomy value, arguing that speech "should receive constitutional protection ... because and to the extent that it is a
manifestation of individual autonomy."7 5 Moreover, because "nothing in the
notion of liberty or autonomy distinguishes speech from other meaningful
behavior," he concludes that all behavior-communicative or not-should
be covered. 76 Baker further argues that nonlinguistic conduct should be protected if it "furthers key first amendment values" and if it "promote[s] first

75. C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 981 (1997);
see also E-mail from C. Edwin Baker to John Greenman (Sept. 24, 2007, 19:35) (on file with author).
76.

Baker, supra note 21, at 982.
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amendment values in a relevantly similar manner" to speech." This leads
him to argue that sex, for instance, should be covered.78
Baker's broader justification of this view turns on his theory of liberty,
which is ingenious.7 9 But it does not describe First Amendment caselaw and
does not purport to. It is, instead, a normative argument in favor of a libertarian constitutional order.80 Baker's values-only interpretation of the First
Amendment cannot account for what is, only what might be.
David Strauss's work is also relevant here. Strauss has argued for what
he calls the "persuasion principle," the theory that "[t]he government may
not suppress speech on the ground that it is too persuasive."8 ' Like me,
Strauss argues that protected behavior can be identified by the way it affects
the listener.8 2 But he goes on to argue that the persuasion principle is justified by the autonomy value, applying a Kantian definition of autonomy.8 3 In
order to be consistent with his autonomy justification, Strauss limits the application of his principle to behaviors that appeal to "reason. '8 4 But even if
we accept "reason" as a meaningful, justiciable category, such a principle
necessarily excludes not only most nonlinguistic communication but also
much protected speech. (If "Fuck the Draft"85 appeals to reason, then that
category has very porous boundaries.) Thus, as Strauss admits, his principle
cannot explain First Amendment coverage, but can only provide
a compel6
ling rationale for protecting behavior in a limited set of cases.1
Scholars who focus on values alone thus cannot define communication.
But even if communication is not defined by any particular First Amendment value, looking at those values collectively can help describe the
requirements for communication, because it has to be true that acts that are
deemed communicative serve at least one First Amendment value.
Testing the free-will theory of communication against this criterion, we
see that under the free-will theory, all communicative acts must serve classical First Amendment values. Described broadly, the classical First
77.

See id. at 1009.

78.

Id. at 983 n.12.

79. Baker distinguishes between allocation rules, which allocate a choice to one person or
another and therefore do not formally restrict liberty, and general prohibitions, which prevent everyone from making a given choice and therefore restrict aggregate formal liberty. Id. at 997-1008.
Baker argues that only general prohibitions trigger liberty-based constitutional concerns. Id.
80. Id. at 1013 ("The strong presumptive principle against violations of formal liberty and
the particular categorizations devised here to implement that principle can, I think, only be justified
as an intellectual (and potentially political) strategy to get at the best substantive results.").
81. David Strauss, Persuasion,Autonomy and Freedom of Expression, 91 CoLUM. L. REv.
334, 334 (1991).
82.

Id.

83.

Id. at 354-55.

84.

Id. at 335.

85.

See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).

86. Strauss, supra note 81, at 357 n.64 ("My concern here is not to describe exhaustively
what the first amendment protects, but to examine the extent to which the persuasion principle
should be accepted as a reason to forbid restrictions on speech.").
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Amendment values are deliberative democracy, truth seeking, and liberty17
autonomy maximization. Looking at these collectively, communicative
acts, under the free-will theory, would not uniquely serve any single value,
but all communicative acts would further at least one value.
Consider, for instance, the deliberative-democracy rationale. There
would be no deliberative democracy if people could not disagree with arguments presented to them. The truth-seeking rationale-the marketplace-ofideas theory-would likewise be frustrated if listeners were constrained to
agree with what they heard. Obviously, a true marketplace of ideas requires
that consumers of ideas be able to reject them.
Under the free-will theory, communicative acts also increase liberty.
This would not be the case under the coarse definition of communication,
which would include acts that convey thoughts that the recipient can't resist.
In those cases, the speaker has the liberty to do what she wants, but the recipient loses the ability to respond as she wants. But liberty is maximized
when the speaker's right to convey consensual thoughts is protected, because the speaker has the freedom to speak, and the listener has the freedom
to disagree or not to feel the way the communication is intended to make her
feel. Communication, as I define it, thus enhances liberty by definition. The
speaker presents the listener with a state of mind, and the listener is free to
reject it. 8
The free-will theory is thus consistent with a multiple-values view of the
First Amendment. Each classical value is furthered by communicative behavior, but not all behaviors that further any one value are communicative. 89
B. Descriptionof Speech-Conduct Law
Here, for the first time, I will discuss speech-conduct law, the set of
cases most relevant to communication. As I have noted, knowing what
communication is doesn't answer any doctrinal questions by itself. Part of
the reason that the simple problem of defining communication has never
been undertaken before is that it is woven into difficult doctrinal questions
in ways that are hard to untangle. So, before discussing speech-conduct
law-the set of cases most relevant to communication-let me tease out a
few threads.
I have previously distinguished questions of "coverage" and "protection." "Covered" acts simply invoke the First Amendment (or should, at

87.
1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:3 (1996)
(describing "[t]hree classic free speech theories-'marketplace of ideas,' 'human dignity and selffulfillment,' and 'democratic self-governance' ").

88. Of course this is only necessarily true proximately-arguing for fascism might reduce
aggregate liberty-but the analysis has to be at the proximate level if communication is to be identified.
89. My description of First Amendment values is necessarily abbreviated. In part this is
because volumes have been written about each theory, and I simply cannot address them in any way
that is responsive to the scholarship. But it is also because the case for the free-will theory stems
mostly from its descriptive accuracy, not from any value-based description.
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least), while "protected" acts are protected from regulation. The government
can regulate protected acts, but only with really good reason, and only after
showing that the costs outweigh the benefits-a showing in which it bears
the burden of proof. 9° Doctrinally, this balancing function occurs through the
tiered constitutional-scrutiny system. 9' The "interest" and "tailoring" requirements force the government to show that the good the challenged law
does outweighs its ancillary costs. 9' These requirements may vary with the
type of speech at issue.93
Coverage is more complicated. The First Amendment is interested in
behavior when it facilitates communication and does something else. Post
has construed this "something else" as serving First Amendment values 4
However this additional requirement is characterized, we can conceive of it
as related to the justifications for free speech. It is not enough to speak--one
must speak in ways that the First Amendment cares about.
Stepping back, then, it seems that First Amendment analysis should require three different tests: one that describes communication, another that
indicates what sort of communication serves First Amendment values, and a
third that indicates when the government can regulate covered speech.9
Of course, actual free-speech law looks very little like what I'm describing. But it is useful to isolate these questions so we can see how they are
incorporated into the various doctrinal tests. Doctrinally, defining communication is most relevant to speech-conduct law. At the heart of this set of
cases is a single question-namely, when does nonlinguistic behavior trigger First Amendment scrutiny?
There is no simple answer. The cases variously refer to nonlinguistic
communication as "expressive conduct, ' 96 "symbolic expression, "symbolic conduct,"' ' 9 or "combined" speech and conduct. 99 Optimally, these
terms would have distinct meanings, and the Supreme Court, operating under an announced rule, would slot behavior into one of the categories. But

90. Elena Kagan, PrivateSpeech, Public Purpose: The Role of GovernmentalMotive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413,442 (1996).
91.
See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2007)
("Under strict scrutiny, the Government must prove that [the law] furthers a compelling interest and
is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.").
92.

See id.
93, As happens with, for example, commercial speech. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (discussing commercial speech).
94.

See Post, supra note 69, at 715-17.
95. It might also be true that, as Post suggests, the balancing tests for covered speech differ
according to the kind of speech protected. See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1275-77 (1995).
96.

City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000).

97.

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003).

98.

Id. at 360 n.2.

99.

United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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the terms are used without any particular justification or pattern, and there is
no reason to pretend that they collectively form a coherent body of law.
Instead, the Court does one of three things when forced to decide
whether nonlinguistic behavior is communicative. It either (1) applies the
O'Brien mixed-speech-and-conduct test,' °° (2) assesses whether the behavior
is covered under the "message" test established in Spence v. Washington,'5 '
or (3)" fashions
an ad hoc test based on conclusory use of the word "expres2
sive.

The first move-relying on the O'Brien test-is quite common. This test
combines a content-neutrality test and a scrutiny standard: the contentneutrality prong goes to coverage and the scrutiny prong to protection. But
the O'Brien analysis contains no test for communication. Rather, an act is
deemed communicative by virtue of being slotted in the combined speech
and conduct category.
This would be fine if there were some principled reason behind it. But
no one has any idea when behavior falls into the combined speech and conduct category, or why. Combined how? In a certain ratio of speech to
conduct? But what would that ratio be, and how can courts measure it? Indeed, the idea of combined speech and conduct was picked apart long ago.103
If not subjected to O'Brien scrutiny, nonlinguistic putative communication can-at the Justices' unguided discretion-be assessed under the test
announced in Spence v. Washington, an early flag-desecration case. Spence
held that nonlinguistic behavior brings the First Amendment into play when
"[a]n intent to convey a particularized message [i]s present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood [i]s great that the message would be
understood by those who view[] it."' 4
The Spence test is thus a pure communication test, one that restates the
coarse definition of communication while adding the requirement that the
mental state conveyed must be a "particularized message." Problematically,
it's hard to figure out what a particularized message is. My best gloss is that
it means that the act must be reducible to language. But if that is what is
meant by particularized message, the Spence test is subject to the same criticisms that ideaism is. 10 5
100.

Id. at 377. The O'Brien test is explained as follows:

[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id.
101.

418 U.S. 405,410-11 (1974).

102.

See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65-

66 (2006).
103. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1494-96 (1975).
104.

Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.

105.

See supra Section I.C.1.
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When not applying Spence or O'Brien, the Court engages in ad hoc test
making. This technique is on display in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
and Institutional Rights, Inc. ("FAIR"), 0 6 the Court's most recent speechconduct decision. FAIR addressed the constitutionality of the Solomon
Amendment, a law that cut federal funding to law schools that forced the
armed forces to recruit off campus in order to protest the military's policies

toward homosexuals. 7 The Court concluded that the schools' exclusion of
military recruiters was not "inherently expressive" and therefore not covered
by the First Amendment.'
In making this determination, the Court did not cite Spence.' °9 Instead it
came up with a new test, holding that nonlinguistic behavior was protected
if it was "inherently expressive,""0 like flag burning."' Behavior is inherently expressive, the Court concluded, if people could grasp its message
without relying on explanatory language. ' 2 In practice, schools that defied
the Solomon Amendment forced military recruiters to work outside the law
school but allowed them to recruit on the attached undergraduate campus."'
The Court concluded that without some accompanying verbal explanation, a
viewer wouldn't know that this exclusion from the law-school campus was
in protest of the military's policies. ' 4 Instead, the viewer might think that
the law school was just short on rooms. ' 5 This need for outside explanation
contrasts with flag burning, whose communicative force, presumably, is
conveyed without accompanying language. 16
Although the FAIR test is new, the Court made no real attempt to reconcile it with existing doctrine. Nor did it consider the test's ramifications, or
give guidance as to the scope of its application. Even taken on its own
terms, the FAIR test seems ill conceived. There are many communicative
acts, such as modern dance and picketing, whose purpose would be unclear
without some linguistic explanation. Indeed, one could make the point about
flag burning. One proper method for disposing of a flag is burning," 7 so
communication outside the burning itself is necessary to help the viewer
determine whether a flag is burned for disposal or protest. The FAIR test
106.

547 U.S. 47 (2006).

107.

FAIR, 547 U.S. at 48.

108.

Id. at 66.

109.

Id.

110.

Id.

111.

Id. (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (a flag-burning case)).

112.

See id.

113.

See id.

114.

Id.

115.

Id.

116. The Court, providing an alternative rationale, also concluded that the regulation survived
O'Brien scrutiny. See id. at 67.
117. See Am. Legion, Ceremony for the Disposal of Unserviceable Flags, http://
www.legion.org/national/americanflag/unserviceable (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).
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thus fails to define communication on its own terms. But even if the test
made sense in context, it is not part of any real effort by the Court to develop a consistent, workable jurisprudence for determining whether
nonlinguistic behavior is covered by the First Amendment. The Court seems
to have abandoned the effort, if it ever made one. When confronted with the
same question, the Court might apply the FAIR test, or O'Brien, or
Spence-or it might do something new all over again.
The law, in sum, is a mess.
C. The Free-Will Theory and Content-NeutralityAnalysis
To review, we are trying to locate the role of a communication standard
in actual First Amendment law. I have argued that for an act to invoke the
First Amendment, it must at least facilitate communication. This suggests
one obvious way that a communication standard is relevant to coverage: the
communication standard is necessary to determine whether an act is communicative in the first place. And if communicative acts are those intended
to invoke freely willed responses, then the standard will be most relevant
when there is dispute over whether observing a behavior changes the viewer
in spite of herself. So, for example, the long-running feud over whether
nude dancing is expressive reflects disagreement as to whether one can
watch nude dancers and choose not to be aroused.'
But there is another way in which a communication standard is relevant
to First Amendment law: a communication standard is necessary for a principled application of a content-neutrality test. Content neutrality is the view
that First Amendment coverage depends in some way on the government's
orientation toward the content of the communication it seeks to suppressthat is, whether the law is in some sense directed toward suppressing that
content.• •In 119truth, this theory has many names and variations (including purposivism), but these distinctions-while important-are beyond the scope
of this Article.
But if content-neutrality analysis means sniffing out government hostility toward content, we need to know what it means to be hostile to content.
And here it must mean hostility to the communicative effects of an act. Because, whatever "content" is, 12 it would not do for the state to avoid First
Amendment scrutiny by arguing that it is not hostile to the form of the
communication, but to the changes it makes in the world. Imagine, for
118.

See infra Section II.E. L

119.
See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The FirstAmendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001)
(arguing for an analysis focused on government purpose); see also Kagan, supra note 90, at 414
(arguing that the analysis should focus on motive).
120.
"Content" is another one of those words that everyone uses but no one wants to think
about. As best as I can capture it, "content" is roughly synonymous with "information," referring to
meaningful phrases in information systems. But it is also sometimes used to describe acts in which
no ideas are conveyed, including nude dancing. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 581
(1991) (Souter, J., concurring) ("Such is the expressive content of the dances described in the record."). Presumably in these contexts content refers to the sensory experience of the communicative
act: the way that an erotic dance looks, or the way that objectionable music sounds.
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instance, that the government wants to suppress pro-union speech. Could it
then escape constitutional scrutiny by arguing that, while it likes the word
"union" (the content) in and of itself, it wants to keep people from joining
unions (the effects), and therefore is acting in a content-neutral way? Such a
reading runs contrary to modem First Amendment law.
Moreover, if the First Amendment protects communication, then it must
protect behaviors that are to be regulated for their communicative impact.
Content neutrality, in other words, indicates neutrality toward the communicative effects of speech. 2 '
If content neutrality means neutrality toward communicative effects, one
needs a theory of communication in order to identify those effects. Until
now we have lacked such a theory. The result, inevitably, is confusion:
courts are unable to articulate what consequences of regulated speech a law
may legitimately target. In the Supreme Court, this uncertainty has manifested itself, among other places, in the secondary-effects doctrine, which
prohibits regulations aimed at speech's "primary" effects122 but not regulations aimed at its "secondary effects.' 23 The Court has never explained
24
which effects are "secondary," however, and the term itself is ambiguous.
Post has aptly described this problem:
The challenge, then, is to specify the kinds of causal relationships between
speech and its impacts that secondary effects doctrine should target....
Should a law that prohibits pornographic movies because they allegedly
increase the rate of crimes against women be deemed content-based or
content-neutral? What of a law that suppresses violence in the media because of an asserted connection to violent crimes? Or a law regulating
corporate speech during elections in order to avert voter alienation?...
The free-will theory answers these questions. If communication changes
people's minds only when they will it to, communicative effects are those
brought about-both remotely and proximately-through freely willed responses. A law that targeted pornography to prevent violence against
women, for instance, would be regulable if the average consumer of pornography became more inclined
•1 126 to violence despite himself-if the change was
forced rather than willed. A theory of communication is thus a necessary

121.

See Volokh, supra note 1, at 1347.

122.

See Linmark Assocs. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977).

123.

See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000).

124.

Secondary could mean "causally remote," for instance.

125.

Post, supra note 95, at 1267.
126. The Seventh Circuit faced this issue in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 E2d
323 (7th Cir. 1985), when it considered a challenge to an antipomography statute drafted by Catharine Macinnon. Id. at 325. The court concluded that although pornography did harm women, it did
so in the same way that persuasive speech such as Hitler's oratory did. Id. at 329. The court correctly concluded that not all behavior that effectuates unconscious mental change in the listener is
noncommunicative, but failed to explain why some behaviors that cause unconscious changeschanges like pain and fear-are not communicative. See id. at 330.
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element to a content-neutrality test; the free-will theory supplies that element. 127
D. Identifying Freely Willed Responses
I have so far argued that communication is a diverse set of practices with
no particular form; that other theories misclassify communication by identifying it with characteristics that are only correlated with it; that the free-will
theory best describes the outcomes of First Amendment cases; that it is
normatively consistent with the multiple-values view of the First Amendment; that it can determine which acts are communicative and therefore help
articulate First Amendment coverage; and that it identifies communicative
effects and is therefore necessary for a principled application of a contentneutrality test.
Before applying the free-will theory, then, I need only argue that it will
work in practice-that asking whether behaviors invoke freely willed responses would be a good way of settling doctrinal controversies in the real
world.
The practical benefit of the theory, then, is not that it will provide determinate answers to every question, but that it will make us argue about the
right things. This can help by getting us out of the trap of talking about
"ideas" and "symbols" and so forth. Trashing bad theory, in other words, is
useful in its own right. 28 Even if the free-will theory of communication became a fig leaf for the exercise of bare intuition, relying on bare intuition
would be preferable to referencing misguided rhetoric-rhetoric that someone might actually take seriously.
Beyond clearing out the cobwebs, applying the free-will standard could
also helpfully guide us toward relevant factual evidence. Identifying freely
willed states of mind-states of mind for which a person can rightfully be
held accountable 29-is central to criminal and tort law and finds expression
127. Posner has effectively argued that instead of focusing on government purpose or motive,
the analysis should be consequentialist, weighing the speech suppressed by a regulation against the
harm prevented. See Posner, Pragmatism, supra note 62, at 738-39. I cannot fully address Posner's
argument here, but it is worth thinking about. In any event, even under Posner's consequentialist
view a theory of communication is necessary. If the effects of speech are to be weighed, speech
must be identified, and it cannot be identified without some theory delineating what distinguishes it
from all other behavior.
128. See generally Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984).
129. Here let me explain what I mean by free will. I write as a pragmatist. The pragmatist
views the task of finding the foundation of human knowledge to be either "impossible or uninteresting, and in either case not worth doing." Posner, Pragmatism, supra note 62, at 738. Pragmatists
thus believe that a proposition should be tested "not by its correspondence with 'reality' but by the
consequences of believing or disbelieving it." Id.
From this perspective, one can both be a determinist-that is, think that the laws of nature
leave no room for human agency-and believe that people can be held morally accountable for their
choices. We are better off judging others than not judging others: therefore we should judge. If we
are to judge, we must identify those acts for which people are morally accountable. We call those
acts on which people can be judged "freely willed." My incorporation of the phrase "free will" thus
does not reflect a studied evaluation of the term in light of its philosophical usage, an evaluation I
am neither equipped nor inclined to make. It only recognizes that we have developed a law that
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in the insanity defense, compulsion, entrapment, and volition.'3 ° There is

thus a working body of law centered around the same question I am proposing we ask. Determining whether a strip-club patron could resist arousal, for
instance, is no different from asking if an allegedly insane criminal defendant could have resisted the compulsion to commit a crime. 131 Indeed, it's
the same question, only moved to a new context.

Criminal and tort law thus provide a working template for application of
the free-will theory of communication."' In criminal and tort cases, psychological and neurological evidence is relevant to the question of whether an

act, and the state of mind that accompanied it, were voluntary. The same
evidence can guide factual inquiry about whether an act is communicative.
Indeed, the outcomes are congruous. Music is communication-and drugs
are not-for the same reason that it is easier to prove a lack of culpable
mens rea from a defendant's use of a legal psychotropic drug than it is to
prove that a heavy-metal song compelled someone to commit suicide.'
Of course, aligning the communication analysis with the free-willdeterminism debate in criminal law doesn't solve all our problems. It only
leads to a new set of problems. The role of determinism in the law is highly
controverted, as it must be. 3 4 The role of psychological, sociological, and
neurological evidence to show that a person couldn't have avoided a certain
mental state is similarly controverted. 135 The free-will theory of communica-

tion thus transports a familiar set of unanswerable questions-what it means
to choose, and what science can tell us about whether a choice was freeinto the First Amendment context. But if, as I have argued, we call acts
"communicative" when they invoke freely willed responses, then these are
precisely the unanswerable questions we should be debating.
gives special protection to behaviors intended to convey thoughts to others when-and only whenwe decide that the recipient could be judged for her response. I call these responses "freely willed."
130. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 591, 643-49 (1981) (arguing that these doctrines embed deterministic reasoning in our
criminal-law discourse, which is nominally predicated on the presumption of the actor's free will).
131. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (2001) (providing that a defendant cannot be criminally
liable when he lacks the "substantial capacity ... to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law"). Some version of this rule is in effect in roughly one-third of U.S. states. See Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First
Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51,53 (2006).
132. To be sure, there is an ongoing debate as to whether these doctrines should be understood
as expressions of determinism. See Kelman, supra note 130, at 643-49. See generally Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism out of the CriminalLaw, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. I
(2005).
133. See Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1151 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (finding a failure to
state a claim when the plaintiff's theory was that Ozzy Osbourne's music made the plaintiff's son
kill himself); see also McGowan, supra note 22, at 1599 n.86 (collecting cases in which courts
rejected the argument that music or other performances were incitement unprotected by the First
Amendment).
134.

See Redding, supra note 131.

135. See generally id.; Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To
Junk or Not to Junk?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing propriety of psychiatric testimony in criminal trials).
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Here one might object that the introduction of scientific evidence would
disfigure the law by proving that acts now deemed communicative do not
invoke freely willed responses. But this is to misread the nature of the freewill standard. Like some of the most enduring legal standards-such as the
reasonableness standard-the free-will standard combines both a factual and
a normative question. It has to be that way. Whatever evidence comes from
neuroscience, there is no part of the brain labeled "free will." The role of
scientific evidence in the free-will determination is thus not to overwhelm
the normative question but merely to articulate its contours. If, for instance,
psychological data showed that instrumental music affected the brain like
drugs do, we might just as well deem drug
use communicative as exclude
6
music from First Amendment protection.1
More broadly, the free-will theory can reveal the communication analysis as a site where freedom is negotiated-to show that the debate over
whether an act is speech or conduct is not one about the form of an activity,
or even communicative convention, but rather about how much freedom we
grant ourselves. To call an act communicative, in other words, is to acknowledge the listener as a moral agent; to say otherwise is to deny her that
agency.
Consider, for example, the famous Meese Commission. In the 1980s,
President Reagan appointed the Meese Commission to examine the impact
of pornography on American culture and suggest new laws for the treatment
of obscenity. ' 37While doing its research, the Commission watched a lot of
pornography. The fact that the Commission watched so much pornography, one might argue, proves that pornography doesn't turn people into
criminals-after all, no one on the Commission was later arrested.
If the rationale for limiting pomography were harm prevention, this
criticism would fall short 3 8 : pornography might affect different people in
different ways. But the real issue is one of free will. If the Commission
members were to suggest treating pornography as conduct-as something
that changed people in spite of themselves, so that pornographers were in
some part responsible for the harm viewers caused-they would be granting
others less moral agency than they granted themselves. "We can see this

136. One might say that music is protected because it usually complements language, that
rulemaking tends to be categorical, and that instrumental music is only protected by dint of its association with vocal music. This is undoubtedly true to some degree. But even so, there must be some
principle determining what is communicative other than "association with language." People talk
during violence, but violence is never communication.
137. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GEN'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT
222 (1986) ("We could not have responsibly conducted our inquiry without spending a considerable
period of time examining the materials that constitute the subject of this entire endeavor.").
138. This implicates the argument famously made by Catharine MacKinnon that pornography
is punishable because it harms women. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil
Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985). I am not arguing that MacKinnon is
incorrect. Under my theory, pornography could be punishable either if it were communicative and
caused sufficient harm or if were not communicative-that is, if it changed viewers against their
will.
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stuff and choose not to be changed; normal viewers cannot." That this premise is offensive to a rights-based system of law seems obvious.
E. Application: Nude Dancing and PublishingCode
Having argued that the free-will theory can improve doctrine, I am going
to give two examples: the nude-dancing cases and cases that govern whether
publication of computer source code is protected speech. In both sets of
cases, the law or scholarship is confused because authors have been writing
without a theory of communication.
1. Nude Dancing
The two most recent cases governing the power of a state to directly
regulate erotic dancing are Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.'39 and City of Erie v.
Pap'sA.M.' 40 In Barnes, the owners of a nightclub wanted to present totally
nude dancing, but Indiana law required dancers to wear G-strings and pasties.' 4' The challenged law did not just prohibit nude dancing, but rather all
public nudity.142 The Court held that the law was constitutional, with Chief
Justice Rehnquist announcing the judgment as part of a three-Justice plurality.143 The plurality wrote that nude dancing is expressive conduct within
"the outer perimeters" of the First Amendment, although "only marginally
so.'" But the opinion did not explain why. It also applied the O'Brien test
without any justification, except a brief comment explaining that the
O'Brien test resembles the time, place, or manner test-a test that is itself
inapplicable to Indiana's general prohibition on nudity.
The plurality held that the law was constitutional under the O'Brien test
because it was unrelated to the suppression of free expression and instead
furthered a "substantial government interest in protecting order and morality.', 45 Justice Souter concurred, writing separately to indicate that he
thought the government interest in this case was in curtailing the "secondary
effects" of nude dancing, such as prostitution and sexual assault.146 Justice
Scalia also concurred separately, concluding that the statute was not directed
at the expressive content of nude dancing but at the immorality of nudity
and therefore did not invoke the First Amendment. 47 In dissent, Justice

139.

501 U.S. 560 (1991).

140.

529 U.S. 277 (2000).

141.

Barnes, 501 U.S. at 563.

142.

Id. at 566.

143.

Id. at 562-63.

144.

Id. at 566.

145.

ld. at 569.

146.

Id. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring).

147.

Id. at 575-80 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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White argued that nude dancing was pure expressive conduct and could not
be regulated without a compelling interest. '
Pap'sA.M. was decided nine years later and addressed a statute that also
imposed a general ban on nudity.'4 9 A majority of the Court again concluded
that nude dancing was only barely covered, holding "that it falls only within
the outer ambit of the First Amendment's protection."'50 A five-Justice plurality again concluded that the ban should be analyzed under the O'Brien
test.'5' Justice O'Connor, joined by three other Justices, announced the
52
judgment in an opinion holding that the law was constitutional as applied.
Here, instead of finding that the ban passed the O'Brien test because the
government had a substantial interest in promoting morality, the plurality
concluded that the government had a substantial interest in regulating secondary effects."' Justice Stevens's dissent argued that nude dancing was
expressive conduct 5 4 and that the law itself was directed at the expressive
content of nude dancing.'55
We can take two points from these cases. First, while most Justices conclude that nude dancing is just barely covered by the First Amendment,
some Justices think that it is not covered at all. Second, a ruling plurality
agrees that the legality of the statute depends on what the government's interest is, but there is disagreement as to what constitutes a legitimate
interest.
The debate thus turns first on whether nude dancing is communication
and second on whether the alleged secondary effects the government seeks
to regulate are communicative. The first question is controverted, I think,
because it reflects disagreement as to whether a patron could watch an erotic
dance and choose not to be aroused. Consider a spectrum of hypotheticals
covering the same sex act: (1) a dispassionate written description using
clinical language, (2) a written description that is meant to arouse, (3) a film
of the act, (4) a simulation of the act performed by a nude dancer on stage,
and (5) the act itself. Now consider the law. Doctrinally, doing it in the flesh
is conduct, 1 6 while seeing it in a movie or reading a book about it is speech
(so long as the book or movie isn't obscene). Live dancing is the liminal
case. But all these behaviors have the same content. The law is not distinguishing between them because of the value of the messages they send. The
difference is the degree to which the recipient can resist arousal.

148.

Id. at 596 (White, J., dissenting).

149.

City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 283 (2000).

150.

Id. at289.

151.

ld. at296.

152.

Id.

153.

Id.

154.

Id. at 326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

155.

Id. at 331.

156.

See Garland, supra note 17, at 196.
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As to whether arousal is a freely willed mental response to nude dancing, I believe that it is. Erotic nudity is simply too pervasive in societyfrom classical painting to high-art films157-to permit the conclusion that the
harmful mental changes it wreaks can't be resisted. This permissiveness
toward eroticism in other contexts demonstrates a belief in the moral agency
of its viewers that would be abridged if erotic dancing in strip clubs were
forbidden solely because it lacked the trappings of art.
If nude dancing's exile to the First Amendment's hinterlands is explained by uncertainty over whether arousal is freely willed, the state's right
to regulate nude dancing turns on application of the secondary-effects doctrine. The alleged secondary effects are violence, public intoxication, and
prostitution.'58 Under the free-will theory, the analysis is properly construed
as identifying communicative effects. If nude dancing invokes arousal, does
arousal lead to increased violence, public intoxication, and prostitution?
Scholars like Amy Adler have argued that it does not. Adler points out
that the relevant law forbids nude dancing but not near-nudedancing: wearing a G-string and pasties is acceptable. 9 Therefore, she argues, the state
must prove that nude dancing causes prostitution, violence, and drug use
not-in other words, that two stars and a
while near-nude dancing would
6
0
strip of cloth can stop crime.1
In Adler's characterization, the state's position is not just wrong, but
pathological, demonstrating a fear of female genitalia.16 But the state's case
isn't crazy, and it doesn't turn on proving that looking at genitals makes
people go bad. Instead, it turns on proving that there is more crime in allnude clubs than near-nude clubs. This might be true for reasons other than
the corrosive effects of genitals. The two types of clubs might attract different patrons and employees and therefore have different cultures, or the
visual reminder of the law and the accompanying threat of inspection might
alter behavior in larger ways.
But even if the state's position can be construed as a matter of influencing "culture," and not a matter of an uninterrupted causal connection
between seeing genitals and crime, that does not mean the state has proved
that secondary effects are noncommunicative. It is hard-perhaps conceptually impossible-to disassociate a culture from the communication it
fosters. If the government could censor communication because it contributed to a culture that was more amenable to crime, then a fair amount of
157.

See Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F2d 1081, 1089-94 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner,

J., concurring), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
158.

Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 297.

159. See Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108, 1129 (2005).
160.

See id.

In part this is just an instance of the sorites paradox. All distinctions look silly at the
161.
limit. If it is absurd to say that G-strings will stop crime, it is equally absurd to say that evidence in a
crime is fresh the day before the statute of limitations runs out but stale the day after. The limitations
period just represents society's best attempt to balance the contravening interests at stake, as does
the G-string requirement to those who defend it.
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protected speech-curse words 6 and general statements of disrespect to
161
authority 6-would fall outside the First Amendment's reach. However
tenuous the link, the secondary-effects argument turns on the way nude
dancing changes people's minds. This makes the secondary effects communicative. Under this standard, Pap'sA.M. was wrongly decided.
2. Code Cases
In the last decade, a series of cases have analyzed whether computerprogramming code is covered by the First Amendment. These cases arise in
two contexts. The first line of cases stems from the government's attempts to
regulate, for national-security reasons, the export of encryption technology
that could be used to communicate secret messages. The second arises from
movie studios' attempts to use intellectual-property laws to enjoin publication of a program that enables digital copying of DVDs. Both situations
show how the lack of any real definition of communication has led the law
astray-.164
a. Encryption-Export Cases
The lead case in the national-security line is Bernstein v. United States
Department of Justice. 65 Bernstein, a Ph.D. candidate, wrote a program
called Snuffle using C, a source-code programming language.166 Snuffle was
an encryption program that could convert a comprehensible written message-like a sonnet or a football score-into an incomprehensible cipher
text. The program could also be used by someone with a "key"-a large
number-to decrypt the cipher text back into comprehensible text. 67
The Ninth Circuit explained source code as follows:
"Source code" . . . refers to the text of a program written in a "high-level"
programming language, such as "PASCAL" or "C." The distinguishing
feature of source code is that it is meant to be read and understood by humans and that it can be used to express an idea or a method. A computer
... can make no direct use of source code until it has been translated
("compiled") into a "low-level" or "machine" language, resulting in

162.

See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).

163.

See id.

164. Before getting to the cases, let me point out a complication that is particular to code:
code facilitates communication both as a tool and a medium of contact. By medium of contact I
mean the thing that the reader experiences through the senses. Code is a medium of contact when a
computer programmer (or someone else) reads or hears it, but it is a tool when it is used to make
something-an image or song or so forth-that is seen or heard. In discussing these cases, I am
analyzing code as a medium of contact; the importance of code as a tool will have to wait for another time.
165. (Bernstein IV), 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g en banc granted & opinion withdrawn, 192 F3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
166.

Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State (Bernstein 1), 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

167.

Bernstein IV, 176 F.3d at 1137.
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computer-executable "object code."... Because source code is destined
for the maw of an automated, ruthlessly literal translator-the compiler-a
programmer must follow stringent grammatical, syntactical, formatting,
and punctuation conventions. As a result,
168 only those trained in programming can easily understand source code.

In addition to the Snuffle encryption program, Bernstein also wrote a
paper explaining his encryption method. 6 9 Later he wrote a set of instructions in English explaining how to program a computer to encrypt and
decrypt data using the techniques in Snuffle, "essentially translating verbatim his Source Code into prose form.' ' 70 Bernstein wanted to publish these
materials-the paper, the source-code program, and the prose instructions-

for academic discussion. The government requires that some encryption
technologies must be licensed before disclosure to a foreign person,
and
7
1
Bernstein was worried that his materials would require a license.
Bernstein applied for a license.' 72 After some back and forth, the State
Department concluded that Snuffle was a munition under the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations Act, and that Bernstein would need a license to
"export" the source code and the instructions, but not the paper.17 Bernstein
sued, arguing that the export restrictions violated the First Amendment. The
district court found that the restrictions were unconstitutional, reasoning that
the posting of source code was pure speech.' 74 The district court's influential
explanation is worth quoting at length:
Bernstein's encryption system is written, albeit in computer language
rather than in English. ...It would be convoluted indeed to characterize
Snuffle as conduct in order to determine how expressive it is when, at least
formally, it appears to be speech.... ["]Language is by definition speech,
and the regulation of any language is the regulation of speech."
Whether source code and object code are functional is immaterial to
the analysis at this stage .... Thus, even if Snuffle source code, which is
168. Id. at 1140. Here is an excerpt from Snuffle 5.0:
for (;;)
uch = gtchr(;
if (!(n & 31))
for (i = 0; i<64; i+ +)
1[ctr[i] I = k[i] + h[n - 64 + i]
Hash512 (wm, wl, level, 8);
)
Id. at 1140 n.1l.
169. Id. at 1136.
170. Id.
171. Bernstein 1,922 F. Supp. at 1430.
172. See Bernstein IV,176 F.3d at 1136.
173. Id. at 1136 n.2.
174. Bernstein 1, 922 F. Supp. at 1437. Because the parties had argued for the less restrictive
O'Brien standard, the court applied that test without considering other options. Id.
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easily compiled into object code for the computer to read and easily used
for encryption, is essentially functional, that does not remove it from the
realm of speech. Instructions, do-it-yourself manuals, recipes, even technical information about hydrogen bomb construction ... are often purely

functional; they are also speech.

'

75

b. DeCSS Cases
The DeCSS cases stem from what was, in retrospect, a sad attempt by a
consortium of businesses to prevent unlicensed copying of commercial
DVDs. This consortium, which included movie studios and DVD-player
manufacturers, 76 developed an encryption algorithm called CSS. "7' As part
of a comprehensive licensing scheme, the consortium encrypted all DVDs
and installed CSS on licensed DVD players, so that only licensed players
could play encrypted DVDs. Jon Johansen, a fifteen-year-old Norwegian
boy, and two of his anonymous Internet buddies then broke CSS by reverse
engineering it.'78 They then created DeCSS, a program that decrypted CSSprotected DVDs, enabling users to copy and play them.' 79 Johansen posted
an executable version of DeCSS in object-code '8 form on his website for
anyone to download and use.
DeCSS was soon all over the Web. ' Movie studios began writing ceaseand-desist letters to the operators of websites that made DeCSS available for
download.1 2 One such operator was Eric Corley, who published a magazine
for computer hackers and oversaw an online version of the magazine.' 3
Corley posted both source- and object-code versions of DeCSS on his website."4 Universal Studios sued to enjoin Corley (and the corporation he ran)
from making DeCSS available for download from his website and from
linking to other websites that did.'85
The law that Universal relied on-the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA")-is controversial in its own right. s6 The DMCA forbids, among
175. Id. at 1435 (citations omitted) (quoting Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69
F3d 920, 935 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), vacated, 520 U.S. 43 (1997)).
176.

Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, Ill F Supp. 2d 294, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

177.

Id.

178.

Id. at 311.

179.

Id.

180. Object code is the pure binary code read by a computer. See Universal City Studios, Inc.
v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 438-39 (2d Cir. 2001).
181.

Id. at 439.

182.

Id.

183.

Id.

184.

Id.

185.

id. at 441.

186. The DMCA has been broadly attacked by intellectual-property scholars. See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA's
Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111 (2005); Thomas A. Mitchell, Copyright,
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other things, trafficking in any technology "primarily designed ...for the
purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls
access" to digital copyrighted material.8 7 In response, Corley argued that
DeCSS was pure expression
and that the injunction therefore violated the
88
First Amendment.
The Second Circuit concluded that "computer code conveying information is 'speech' within the meaning of the First Amendment" 189:
Instructions such as computer code, which are intended to be executable
by a computer, will often convey information capable of comprehension
and assessment by a human being .... Moreover, programmers communi-

cating ideas to one another almost inevitably communicate in code, much
as musicians use notes. Limiting First Amendment protection of programmers to descriptions of computer code (but not the code itself) would
impede discourse among computer scholars, just as limiting protection for
musicians to descriptions of musical scores (but not sequences of notes)
would impede their exchange of ideas and expression. 9
c. How to Determine Whether Code Is Communicative
The code cases demonstrate the problems that arise when First Amendment analysis proceeds without a definition of communication. The
existence of misleading theories-ideaism and symbolism in particularleads courts to think that noncommunicative acts are communicative merely
because they resemble speech: "Language is by definition speech, and the
regulation of any language is the regulation of speech.... Instructions, doit-yourself manuals, recipes, even technical information about hydrogen
bomb construction ...are often purely functional; they are also speech."' 9'
Using symbols is not speech, however-only using symbols to convey
thoughts that people could freely resist is speech. But computers have no
free will; they can't disagree with code. The analogy with instructions is
thus dead wrong. Instructions are orders that the reader could choose to resist. Code, on the other hand, is a way of making a machine run.
If code is not communicative in the first instance, it still might be protected if it is used in a communicative way. And here again, the lack of a
definition of communication has led the analysis astray. Consider the pre-

Congress and Constitutionality: How the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Goes Too Far, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2115 (2004); David Nimmer, Back From the Future: A ProlepticReview of

the DigitalMillennium Copyright Act, 16 BERKELEY

TECH.

L.J. 855, 867 (2001); YiJun Tian, Prob-

lems of Anti-Circumvention Rules in the DMCA and More Heterogeneous Solutions, 15 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 749 (2005). I find these attacks convincing, although I'm not

knowledgeable in the field.
187.

17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).

188.

Corley, 273 F.3d at 451.

189.

Id. at 449-50.

190.

Id. at 448.

191.

Id. at 437 (citation omitted).
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vailing 92 scholarly consensus that the DeCSS cases were wrongly decided.
This argument-made most eloquently by David McGowan-holds that
courts have been slow to recognize new conventions of expression and have
unduly emphasized code's "functional" nature.0 93 McGowan argues that
courts tend to miss the expressive intent of posting code among communities interested in programming. 94 He also argues that, to the extent
expressive publication of source code is regulated because it can facilitate
unlawful behavior, it should be covered under incitement law, which requires the State to show a likelihood that an act will cause harm if it is to be
regulated. 95
This story is wrong. Posting code is not like incitement, even though
both acts require an intervening act to cause harm. This is because code can
cause noncommunicative harm, while incitement cannot. To be more precise, harm can ensue from posting code even if the mental change the
publisher of code hopes to bring about does not occur. Taking Johansen at
his word, he meant to initiate a conversation on decryption technique by
posting DeCSS. But the most important effect of DeCSS-video copyingwould occur even if no one understood the techniques it demonstrated.
Indeed, harm could happen even if nobody's mind was changed by the
posting of DeCSS. DeCSS enabled people who already wanted to copy
DVDs to do so. In this respect, posting code is like leaving a loaded gun out
on a windowsill: if someone picks up the gun and shoots a puppy, the liability of the gun owner is not assessed under incitement law. This is true even
if the gun owner left the gun out for communicative purposes-to show off
the stock, or protest antigun laws. That code has some communicative effects does not make it communicative when its most important effect is
noncommunicative.
This does not mean that code should never be covered. It just means that
less code should be covered than the common story proposes. Here we can
contrast Bernstein and Corley. Bernstein was a mathematician who wanted
to make a point about encryption theory.'96 To make this point, he used code,
a medium that was uniquely suited to his project. 97 His program never func98
tioned, because creating a functioning program was incidental to his goal.1
It was therefore primarily important because of what it communicated, not
what it did. Johansen, on the other hand, wrote a working program. Other

192.

But see, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEx. L. REV. 99 (2000).

193.

See McGowan, supra note 22, at 1572-74; Lora Saltarelli, Note, The Digital Millennium

Copyright Act and the Functionality Fallacy, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1647 (2002).

194.

McGowan, supra note 22, at 1573.

195. Id. at 1588-94; see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that
advocacy can be regulated when it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action").
196. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice (Bernstein IV), 176 F.3d 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir.
1999), reh'g en banc granted & opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
197.

Id. at 1140-41.

198.

Id. at 1141 n.14.
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people reposted it, both to make it available for other users and to protest the
law forbidding it.' 99 When Corley reposted DeCSS, he argued that he did so
to communicate the ideas it contained. But DeCSS was not primarily important to anyone-to Corley, Johansen, or the government-for the mental
responses people had after reading it. It was important because it enabled
copying of protected DVDs. 2°°
CONCLUSION

I have argued that communicative behaviors are those that are primarily
important because they invoke freely willed mental responses. In this section, I will briefly consider a few broad implications of my theory.
Let me start by revisiting an earlier point. We saw earlier that while proponents of mentalism argue that communication goes to the mind and not
the body, the real operative distinction is between behaviors that convey
thoughts that are forced on a person and behaviors that convey thoughts a
person can refuse.20 ' This suggests a new way of ordering the world. Instead
of splitting the world between mind and body-between what we experience and what is-we might split the world between acts that force
experiences on us, and acts that allow us to choose experiences. Applying
this distinction will allow us to understand new ways of being. We tend, for
instance, to think of virtual worlds as incorporeal-that is, of being more
mind than body. But worlds are virtual in light of the meaning attached to
them, not by dint of their physical presence. If an online world became so
important that its inhabitants were moved by occurrences there to the same
degree that real-world inhabitants are-if they could not choose whether to
be moved by changes there-then we should not think of it as a virtual
space but as a real one. Indeed, the world is full of information technologies
that are important for their mental effects, not their physical ones. Nonetheless, we would never describe these technologies as "communicative" or
"virtual." Paper money, after all, is an information technology: a way of
keeping track of people's beliefs. But money is still real.
Thinking about communication, in other words, can allow us to see the
world in new ways. Purely symbolic acts-like taking someone's money
199. Committing an unlawful act in order to protest the law making it unlawful cannot, as a
matter of course, be a speech act, or every law would be fairly easily circumvented. O'Brien wasn't
protesting the law against destroying draft cards; he was protesting the war. United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
200. At the trial court, Corley argued that he posted DeCSS because he was covering an important story and testified that writing the story without posting DeCSS would be like "printing a
story about a picture and not printing the picture," an argument that McGowan finds persuasive.
McGowan, supra note 22, at 1572 (citing Transcript of Record at 824-25, Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 1036), aff'd, Universal City Studios, Inc.
v. Corley, 273 E3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001)). But this assumes away the argument, because a picture is
communicative and code generally is not. If an unusual gun were used in a famous murder, many
people would surely like to own a copy. But if a manufacturer sold working replicas (or gave them
away, as Corley did), the government should not have to survive strict-or even O'Brien-levelscrutiny to apply ordinary gun laws to the sale.
201.

See supra Part lI.B.
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through cybertheft-are more like violence because of the coercion they
effect. And nonsymbolic acts-like consensual sex-are in some sense more
like language because of the lack of coercion. The free-will theory of communication allows us to see past these categories (mind and body; signifier
and signified) that are thought to define communication and consider
whether we want to live in the kind of libertarian world that Baker pro202
poses.
The free-will theory can also help us rethink the way our bodies relate to
the world. Our sense of the normal body deeply informs the scope of communication. The law, for instance, treats communication as a visual and
aural phenomenon. Of the five senses, vision and hearing are the only ones
that are normally thought of as conduits for communication-the sense
through which the communicant receives the communication. 2"' All of the
communicative phenomena we have been discussing-reading, talking,
nude dancing, and music-are experienced visually, aurally, or both. (They
can be experienced through other senses as well, but those other inputs are
not considered communicative.) The line between speech and conduct tracks
the difference between sensory inputs. 20 4 Eroticism conveyed through touch
is considered conduct; when conveyed through sight it is expression. No
activity that is primarily experienced through taste or smell is considered
speech. The only tactile experience that qualifies is Braille. Even this fact
is telling; presumably, Braille is speech because it is linguistic and thus a
close analogue of written communication.
But language is not only the only way to communicate. If Braille is covered because it is an analogue of aural and visual language, then other
analogues of visual and aural forms of communication should be covered as
well. For those who can hear, music is an aural experience. But for the deaf,
it is touch based, experienced through vibrations. 206 If aurally experienced
music is communication, then tactilely experienced music could be communication as well. The freedom granted the hearing should run also to the
deaf.
If, in other words, we believe that communication is seen or heard, we
may miss that it can be felt. Indeed, even framing the question this way"What is the deaf version of music?"-is discriminatory; it might just as
well be reversed. There may be forms of communication in the deaf

202.

See supra Section II.B.

203. A particular communicative act can engage different senses on the part of the speaker
and the listener. Someone marching in a protest experiences tactile (as well as visual and aural)
input, but a spectator experiences only visual and aural input. Of course the spectator has tactile
input (she feels the ground beneath her feet), but this sense is not a medium for communication.
204. This distinction might be another usage for the terms mind and body. My sense is that
activities that cause tactile, olfactory, and taste-based input are labeled bodily phenomena.
205. See Am. Council of the Blind v. Boorstin, 644 F. Supp. 811, 815 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding
that the Braille editions of Playboy magazine are covered under the First Amendment).
206. See Corey Kilgannon, Hip-Hop Reverberates In a Silent World, N.Y.
2007, at B 1.

TIMES,
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community that could alert the law to unrecognized communication in hearing life-new freedoms, if we could see them.
We will also, I think, soon need a theory of communication because
technology will change so much that we won't be able to rely on the old
categories even by way of analogy. It is now possible to interact in immer20 7
sive simulated environments, to touch each other (and have "sex"!)
remotely, to bypass sensory input by stimulating the brain directly, and to
transmit brain impulses directly to bionic limbs.20 ' How long, then, before
technology enables one person to convey brain impulses directly to another
without mediation of the senses? And what would we say of this-that it
went to the "mind" and not the "body"? That it conveyed "ideas"? But saying those things would prove nothing at all.
The old metaphors break down. The world will change rapidly, and we
will change too, in ways that we will never recognize, ways that will recreate us and make us recreate what it means to read and write and speak and
think. Against all this we can only hope to see truly-that is, to never mistake the name for its bearer, the blueprint for its architecture, or the map for
its dark territory.

207.
See Xeni Jardin, High-Speed Love Connection, WIRED, June 24, 2004,
www.wired.con/gaming/gamingreviews/news/2004/06/63963 (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).
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See, e.g., Charlotte Hunt-Grubbe, The blade runner generation, TIMES ONLINE, July 22,
2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/lifeand-style/health/article2079637.ece (last visited Jan. 19,
2008).

